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Abstract
Online contention resolution schemes (OCRSs) were proposed by Feldman, Svensson, and Zen-
klusen [FSZ16] as a generic technique to round a fractional solution in the matroid polytope in an
online fashion. It has found applications in several stochastic combinatorial problems where there is a
commitment constraint: on seeing the value of a stochastic element, the algorithm has to immediately
and irrevocably decide whether to select it while always maintaining an independent set in the matroid.
Although OCRSs immediately lead to prophet inequalities, these prophet inequalities are not optimal.
Can we instead use prophet inequalities to design optimal OCRSs?
We design the first optimal 1/2-OCRS for matroids by reducing the problem to designing a matroid
prophet inequality where we compare to the stronger benchmark of an ex-ante relaxation. We also
introduce and design optimal (1 − 1/e)-random order CRSs for matroids, which are similar to OCRSs
but the arrival is chosen uniformly at random.
1 Introduction
Given a combinatorial optimization problem, a common algorithmic approach is to first solve a convex
relaxation of the problem and to then round the obtained fractional solution x into a feasible integral so-
lution while (approximately) preserving the objective. Contention resolution schemes (CRSs), introduced
in [CVZ14], is a way to perform this rounding given a fractional solution x ∈ Rn≥0. For c > 0, intuitively
a c-CRS is a rounding algorithm that guarantees every element i is selected into the final feasible solution
w.p. at least c · xi . For a maximization problem with a linear objective, by linearity of expectation such a
c-CRS directly implies a c-approximation algorithm.
In a recent work, Feldman et al. [FSZ16] introduced an Online CRS (OCRS), which is a CRS with
an additional property that it performs the rounding in an “online fashion”. is property is crucial for
the prophet inequality problem (or any stochastic combinatorial problem with a commitment constraint;
see §1.3).
Definition 1.1 (Prophet inequality). Suppose each element i ∈ N takes a value vi ∈ R≥0 independently
from some known distribution Di . ese values are presented one-by-one to an online algorithm in an
adversarial order. Given a packing feasibility constraint F ⊆ 2N , the problem is to immediately and
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irrevocably decide whether to select the next element i, while always maintaining a feasible solution and
maximizing the sum of the selected values.
A c-approximation prophet inequality for 0 ≤ c ≤ 1 means there exists an online algorithm with
expected value at least c times the expected value of an offline algorithm that knows all values from the
beginning. As shown in [FSZ16], a c-OCRS immediately implies a c-approximation prophet inequality.
Some other applications are oblivious posted pricing mechanisms and stochastic probing.
Although powerful, the above approach of using OCRSs to design prophet inequalities does not give us
optimal prophet inequalities. For example, while we know a 1/2-approximation prophet inequality over
matroids [KW12], we only know a 1/4-OCRS over matroids [FSZ16]. is indicates that the currently
known OCRSs may not be optimal. Can we design beer OCRSs? e main contribution of this work is
to design an optimal OCRS over matroid constraints using the following idea:
Not only can we design prophet inequalities from OCRSs, we can also design OCRSs from prophet
inequalities.
More specifically, our OCRS is based on an ex-ante prophet inequality: we compare the online algorithm to
the stronger benchmark of a convex relaxation. We modify existing prophet inequalities to obtain ex-ante
prophet inequalities while preserving the approximation factors. As a corollary, this gives the first optimal
1/2-OCRS over matroids.
Since for many applications the arrival order is not chosen by an adversary, some recent works have
also studied prophet secretary inequalitieswhere the arrival order is chosen uniformly at random [EHLM17,
EHKS18, ACK18]. Motivated by these works, we introduce random order contention resolution schemes
(RCRS), which is an OCRS for uniformly random arrival1. Again by designing the corresponding random
order ex-ante prophet inequalities, we obtain optimal (1 − 1/e)-RCRS over matroids.
In §1.1 we formally define an OCRS/RCRS and an ex-ante prophet inequality. In §1.2 we describe our
results and proof techniques. See §1.3 for further related work.
1.1 Model
CRSs are a powerful tool for offline and stochastic optimization problems [CVZ14, GN13]. For a given
x ∈ [0, 1]N , let R(x) denote a random set containing each element i ∈ N independently w.p. xi . We say an
element i is active if it belongs to R(x).
Definition 1.2 (Contention resolution scheme). Given a finite ground set N with n = |N | and a packing
(downward-closed) family of feasible subsets F ⊆ 2N , let PF ⊆ [0, 1]
N be the convex hull of all charac-
teristic vectors of feasible sets. For a given x ∈ PF , a c-selectable CRS (or simply, c-CRS) is a (randomized)
mapping π : 2N → 2N satisfying the following three properties:
(i) π (S) ⊆ S for all S ⊆ N .
(ii) π (S) ∈ F for all S ⊆ N .
(iii) PrR(x),π [i ∈ π (R(x))] ≥ c · xi for all i ∈ N .
Notice, if f is a monotone linear function then E[f (π (R(x)))] ≥ c · E[f (R(x))]. By constructing CRSs
for various constraint families of F , Chekuri et al. [CVZ14] give improved approximation algorithms for
linear and submodular maximization problems under knapsack, matroid, matchoid constraints, and their
intersections2.
1A parallel independent work has also introduced RCRS [AW18]; however, their technical results are very different.
2Some “greedy” properties are also required from the CRS for the guarantees to hold for a submodular function f [CVZ14].
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In the above applications to offline optimization problems, the algorithm first flips all the random
coins to sample R(x), and then obtains π (R(x)) ⊆ R(x). For various online problems such as the prophet
inequality, this randomness is an inherent part of the problem. Feldman et al. [FSZ16] therefore introduce
an OCRS where the random set R(x) is sampled in the same manner, but whether i ∈ R(x) (or not) is only
revealed one-by-one to the algorithm in an adversarial order3. Aer each revelation (arrival), the OCRS
has to irrevocably decide whether to include i ∈ R(x) into π (R(x)) (if possible). A c-selectable OCRS (or
simply, c-OCRS) is an OCRS satisfying the above properties (i) to (iii) of a c-CRS.
In this work, we also study RCRS which is an OCRS with the arrival order chosen uniformly at random.
A c-selectable RCRS (or simply, c-RCRS) is an RCRS satisfying the above properties (i) to (iii) of a c-CRS,
where in Property (iii) we also take expectation over the arrival order.
While prophet inequalities have been designed using OCRSs, our main result in this paper is to show
a deeper reverse connection between OCRSs and prophet inequalities. We first define an ex-ante prophet
inequality. Given a prophet inequality problem instance with packing constraints F and r.v.s vi ∼ Di for
i ∈ N , the following ex-ante relaxation gives an upper bound on the expected offline optimum:
max
x
∑
i
xi · Evi∼Di [vi | vi takes value in its top xi quantile] s.t. x ∈ PF . (1)
To prove that (1) is an upper bound, we interpret xi as the probability that i is in the offline optimum. It is
also known that (1) is a convex program and can be solved efficiently; see [FSZ16] for more details.
Definition 1.3 (Ex-ante prophet inequality). For 0 ≤ c ≤ 1, a c-approximation ex-ante prophet inequality
for packing constraints F is a prophet inequality algorithm with expected value at least c times (1).
Before describing our results, to build some intuition for the above definitions we discuss the special
case of a rank 1 matroid, i.e., where we can only select one of the n elements.
Example: Rank 1 matroid For simplicity, in this section we assume that all random variables are
Bernoulli, i.e., vi takes value yi independently w.p. pi , and is 0 otherwise. We first show why a c-OCRS
implies a c-approximation prophet inequality for rank 1 matroids.
Consider the optimum solution x to the ex-ante relaxation (1) for the above Bernoulli instance. Its
objective value is
∑
i xiyi where x satisfies
∑
i xi ≤ 1. Moreover, xi ≤ pi for all i because selecting i beyond
pi does not increase (1). To see why (1) gives an upper bound on the expected offline maximum, observe
that if we interpret xi as the probability that vi is the offline maximum, this gives a feasible solution to∑
i xi ≤ 1 and with value at most
∑
i xiyi . us, to prove a c-approximation prophet inequality, it suffices
to design an online algorithm with value at least c ·
∑
i xiyi . Consider an algorithm that runs a c-OCRS on
x, where i is considered active independently w.p. xi/pi whenever vi takes value yi . is ensures element
i is active w.p. exactly xi . Since a c-OCRS guarantees each element is selected w.p. ≥ c when it is active,
by linearity of expectation such an algorithm has expected value at least c ·
∑
i xiyi .
We now discuss a simple 1/4-OCRS for a rank 1 matroid. Given x satisfying
∑
i xi ≤ 1, consider an
algorithm that ignores each element i independently w.p. 1/2, and otherwise selects i only if it is active.
Since this algorithm selects any element i w.p. at most xi/2 (when i is not ignored and is active), by
Markov’s inequality the algorithm selects no element till the end w.p. at least 1 −
∑
i xi/2 ≥ 1/2. Hence
3For adversarial arrival order, we assume that this order is known to the OCRS algorithm in advance. is offline adversary
is weaker than the almighty adversary considered in [FSZ16], but is common in the prophet inequality literature [Rub16, RS17].
We need this assumption in §2 to define our exponential sized linear program.
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the algorithm reaches each element i w.p. at least 1/2 without selecting any of the previous elements.
Moreover, it does not ignore i w.p. 1/2, which implies it considers each element w.p. at least 1/4. e
OCRS due to Feldman et al. [FSZ16] can be thought of generalizing this approach to a general matroid.
An interesting result of Alaei [Ala14] shows that the above 1/4-OCRS can be improved to a 1/2-OCRS
over a rank 1 matroid by “greedily” maximizing the probability of ignoring the next element i, but consid-
ering i w.p. 1/2 on average. In §A.1 we present Alaei’s proof for completeness. In §A.2, we also show how
to obtain a simple (1 − 1/e)-RCRS for a rank 1 matroid. is raises the question whether one can obtain a
1/2-OCRS and a (1 − 1/e)-RCRS for general matroids.
1.2 Results and Techniques
Our first theorem gives an approximation factor preserving reduction from OCRSs to ex-ante prophet
inequalities.
eorem 1.4. For 0 ≤ c ≤ 1, a c-approximation ex-ante prophet inequality for adversarial (random) arrival
order over a packing constraint F implies a c-OCRS (c-RCRS) over F .
We complement the above theorem by designing ex-ante prophet inequalities over matroids.
eorem 1.5. For matroids, there exists a 1/2-approximation ex-ante prophet inequality for adversarial ar-
rival order and a (1 − 1/e)-approximation ex-ante prophet inequality for uniformly random arrival order.
As a corollary, the above two theorems give optimal OCRS and RCRS over matroids. is generalizes
the rank 1 results discussed in the previous section to general matroids; although the proof techniques are
very different.
Corollary 1.6. For matroids, there exists a 1/2-OCRS and a (1 − 1/e)-RCRS.
Our 1/2-OCRS above assumes that the arrival order is known to the algorithm. It is an interesting open
question to find a 1/2-OCRS for an almighty/online adversary as in [FSZ16].
We first prove that both the factors 1/2 and (1 − 1/e) in Corollary 1.6 are optimal.
Optimality of 1/2-OCRS and (1−1/e)-RCRS Weargue that the factors 1/2 and (1−1/e) in Corollary 1.6
are optimal even in the special case of a rank 1 matroid. For adversarial arrival, consider just two elements,
i.e., n = 2, with x1 = 1 − ϵ and x2 = ϵ for some ϵ → 0. Since the OCRS algorithm has to select the first
element at least 1/2 fraction of the times, it can aempt to select the second element at most 1/2 + ϵ/2
fraction of the times.
For random arrival order, consider the feasible solution xwith xi = 1/n for every i ∈ N . We show that
no online RCRS algorithm can guarantee each element is selected w.p. greater than (1−1/e)n . is is because
for the product distribution, w.p. 1/e none of the n elements is active (more precisely, w.p. (1 − 1/n)n ).
Hence the RCRS algorithm, which only selects active elements, selects some element w.p. 1 − 1/e. is
implies on average it cannot pick every element w.p. greater than (1−1/e)
n
. is example, originally shown
in [CVZ14], also proves that offline CRS cannot beer than (1 − 1/e)-selectable.
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Our techniques Wefirst see the difficulty in extendingAlaei’s greedy approach from a rank 1matroid to
a general matroid. Consider the graphic matroid for the Hat example (see Figure 1). Suppose the base edge
(u1,u2) appears in the end of an adversarial order. Notice that any algorithm which ignores the structure
of the matroid is very likely to select some pair of edges (u1,vi ) and (vi ,u2) for some i. Since this pair spans
the base edge (u1,u2), such an OCRS algorithmwill not satisfy c-selectability for (u1,u2). To overcome this,
Feldman et al. [FSZ16] decompose the matroid into “simpler” matroids using x. However, it is not clear
how to extend their approach beyond a 1/4-OCRS.
v1
v2
vn−1
vn
u1 u2
Figure 1: e Hat example on n + 2 vertices. e following x belongs to the graphic matroid: xe = 1/2 for
e = (ui ,vj ) where i ∈ {1, 2} and j ∈ {1, . . . ,n}, and xe = 1 for e = (u1,u2).
In this paper we take an alternate LP based approach to design OCRSs, which was first used by Chekuri
et al. [CVZ14] to design offline CRSs. e idea is to define an exponential sized linear program where each
variable denotes a deterministic OCRS algorithm. e objective of this linear program is to maximize c
s.t. each element is selected at least c fraction of the times (c-selectability). us to show existence of a
1/2-OCRS, it suffices to prove this linear program has value c ≥ 1/2. In §2 we prove this by showing that
the dual LP has value at least 1/2 because it can be interpreted as an ex-ante prophet inequality.
Next, to show there exists a 1/2 approximation ex-ante prophet inequality, our approach is inspired
from the matroid prophet inequality of Kleinberg and Weinberg [KW12]. ey give an online algorithm
that gets at least half of the expected offline optimum for the product distribution (independent r.v.s).
Unfortunately, their techniques do not directly extend because the ex-ante relaxation objective could be
significantly higher than for the product distribution (this is known as the correlation gap, which can be
e/(e − 1) [ADSY12, CCPV11]). Our primary technique is to view the ex-ante relaxation solution as a
“special kind” of a correlated value distribution. Although prophet inequalities are not possible for general
correlated distributions [HK92], we show that in this special case the original proof of the matroid prophet
inequality algorithm retains its 1/2 approximation aer some modifications.
1.3 Further Related Work
Krengel and Sucheston gave the first tight 1/2-single item prophet inequality [KS78, KS77]. e connec-
tion betweenmultiple-choice prophet inequalities and mechanism design was recognized in [HKS07]; they
proved a prophet inequality for uniform matroids. is bound was later improved by Alaei [Ala11] using
the Magician’s problem, which is an OCRS in disguise. Chawla et al. [CHMS10] further developed the
connection between prophet inequalities and mechanism design, and showed how to be O(1)-prophet in-
equality for general matroids in a variant where the algorithm may choose the element order. Yan [Yan11]
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improved this result to e/(e −1)-competitive using the correlation gap for submodular functions, first stud-
ied in [ADSY12, CCPV11]. Chekuri et al. [CVZ14] adapted correlation gaps to a polytope to design CRSs.
Improved correlation gaps were presented in [Yan11, GL18]. e matroid prophet inequality was first ex-
plicitly formulated in [KW12]. Feldman et al. [FSZ16] gave an alternate proof, and extended to Bernoulli
submodular functions, using OCRSs. Finally, information theoreticO(poly log(n))-prophet inequalities are
also known for general downward-closed constraints [Rub16, RS17].
e prophet secretary notion was first introduced in [EHLM17], where the elements arrive in a uni-
formly random order and draw their values from known independent distributions. eir results have
been recently improved [EHKS18, ACK18]. ere is a long line of work on studying the commitment con-
straints for combinatorial probing problems, e.g., see [GM07, GN13, GNS16, GJSS18]. In these models the
algorithm starts with some stochastic knowledge about the input and on probing an element has to irre-
vocably commit if the element is to be included in the final solution. A common approach to handle such
a constraint is using a prophet inequality/OCRS.
2 OCRS Assuming an Ex-Ante Prophet Inequality
In this section we prove eorem 1.4, showing how to reduce the problem of designing an OCRS to a
prophet inequality where we compare ourself to the ex-ante relaxation instead of the expected offline
maximum.
2.1 Using LP Duality
Given a finite ground set N with n = |N | and a downward-closed family of feasible subsets F ⊆ 2N , let
PF ⊆ [0, 1]
N be the convex hull of all characteristic vectors of feasible sets. Let x ∈ PF and R(x) denote
a random set containing each element i ∈ N independently w.p. xi . For offline CRSs, let Φ
∗ be the set of
valid offline deterministic mappings; i.e., ϕ : 2N → F is in Φ∗ iff ϕ(A) ⊆ A and ϕ(A) ∈ F for allA ⊆ N . For
ϕ ∈ Φ∗ and i ∈ N , let qi,ϕ := PrR(x)[i ∈ ϕ(R(x))] denote the probability of selecting i if the CRS executes ϕ .
e following LP relaxation, introduced by Chekuri et al. [CVZ14], finds a c-selectable randomized CRS. It
has variables {λϕ }ϕ ∈Φ∗ and c.
maxλ,c c
s.t.
∑
ϕ ∈Φ∗
qi,ϕλϕ ≥ xi · c i ∈ N
∑
ϕ ∈Φ∗
λϕ = 1
λϕ ≥ 0 ∀ϕ ∈ Φ
∗
Observe that if the above LP has value c, there exists a randomized c-CRS.is is because we can randomly
select one of theϕ’s w.p. λϕ , and the constraint
∑
ϕ ∈Φ∗ qi,ϕλϕ ≥ xi ·c ensures c-selectability for every i ∈ N .
Chekuri et al. noticed that by strong duality, to prove the above LP has value at least c, it suffices to show
that the following dual program has value at least c. It has variables {yi }i∈N and µ.
miny,µ µ
s.t.
∑
i∈N
qi,ϕyi ≤ µ ϕ ∈ Φ
∗
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∑
i∈N
xiyi = 1
yi ≥ 0 ∀i ∈ N
To design OCRSs (RCRSs), we take a similar approach as Chekuri et al and let Φ∗ be the set of all
deterministic online algorithms. Formally, ϕ : 2N × 2N ×N → {0, 1} belongs to Φ∗ iff ϕ(A,B, i) = 1 only for
B ⊆ A, i < A, and B ∪ {i} ∈ F . Intuitively, ϕ(A,B, i) = 1 indicates that the online algorithm selects element
i in the current iteration aer processing elements in A and selecting elements in B. Let qi,ϕ denote the
probability of selecting i if the OCRS (RCRS) executes ϕ , where for RCRS we also take probability over the
random order. By the above duality argument, to show existence of a c-OCRS (c-RCRS) it suffices to prove
the dual LP has value at least c. We prove this by showing that for any y ≥ 0 s.t.
∑
i∈N xiyi = 1, there
exists ϕ ∈ Φ∗ such that
∑
i∈N qi,ϕyi ≥ c.
Consider a Bernoulli prophet inequality instance where each element i ∈ N has value yi with prob-
ability xi , and 0 otherwise. Since x ∈ PF , notice that
∑
i∈N xiyi = 1 is exactly the value of the ex-ante
relaxation (1) for this instance. us, a c-approximation ex-ante prophet inequality implies there exists
a ϕ ∈ Φ∗ with value at least c. By linearity of expectation, the value of ϕ is
∑
i∈N qi,ϕyi , which proves∑
i∈N qi,ϕyi ≥ c.
2.2 Solving the LP Efficiently
While the original primal LP has an exponential number of variables, we can compute an OCRS (or RCRS)
that achieves value at least c as follows. In the dual program, given y s.t.
∑
i xiyi = 1, we can use the
ex-ante prophet inequality to find ϕ ∈ Φ∗ with value
∑
i qi,ϕyi ≥ c in polynomial time. (Notice qi,ϕ can be
computed in polynomial time because the adversarial order is known to the OCRS algorithm.) is implies
for any ϵ > 0, the polytopeQc−ϵ := {y : y ≥ 0,
∑
i xiyi = 1,
∑
i qi,ϕyi ≤ c − ϵ for all ϕ ∈ Φ
∗} is empty.
Since we have an efficient separation oracle (for any y, we can find a violated constraint in polynomial
time) forQc−ϵ , by running the ellipsoid algorithm [GLS81] we can find a subsetΦ
′ ⊆ Φ∗ with |Φ′ | = poly(n)
in polynomial time such that Q ′c−ϵ := {y : y ≥ 0,
∑
i xiyi = 1,
∑
i qi,ϕyi ≤ c − ϵ for all ϕ ∈ Φ
′} is empty.
Now the following linear program, which has a polynomial number of variables and constraints, with
optimal value at least c − ϵ can be solved efficiently.
maxλ,c c
s.t.
∑
ϕ ∈Φ′
qi,ϕλϕ ≥ xi · c i ∈ N
∑
ϕ ∈Φ′
λϕ = 1
λϕ ≥ 0 ∀ϕ ∈ Φ
′
3 Ex-Ante Prophet Inequalities for a Matroid
is section proves eorem 1.5 by designing for a matroid a 1/2-ex-ante prophet inequality under adver-
sarial arrival and a (1 − 1/e)-ex-ante prophet inequality under random arrival.
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3.1 Notation
Let v ∼ D be a set of random element values {v1, . . . ,vn} where eachvi is independently drawn fromDi .
Let x be the optimal solution to the ex-ante relaxation in (1) for a given matroidM = (N ,I). For i ∈ N ,
denote
yi := Evi∼Di [vi | vi takes value in its top xi quantile]. (2)
Since x ∈ PM , we can write it as a convex combination of independent sets in the matroid. In particular,
this gives a correlated distribution Dˆ over independent sets of M such that for each i ∈ N , we have
PrI∼Dˆ[i ∈ I ] = xi . Let vˆ = {vˆ1, . . . , vˆn} be a set of random values obtained by sampling I ∼ Dˆ and seing
vˆi = yi for i ∈ I , and vˆi = 0 otherwise. Notice the optimal value of (1) is
∑
i xiyi and for each i ∈ N , we
have E[vˆi ] = xiyi .
We need the following notation to describe our algorithms.
Definition 3.1. For any vector vˆ denoting values of elements of N and any A ⊆ N , we define:
• Let Opt(vˆ | A)⊆ N \A denote the maximum value independent set in the contracted matroidM/A.
• Let R(A, vˆ) :=
∑
i∈Opt(vˆ |A) vˆi denote the remaining value aer selecting set A.
We next define a base price of for every element i.
Definition 3.2. ForA ∈ I denoting an independent set of elements accepted by our algorithm, we define
• Let bi (A, vˆ) := R(A, vˆ) − R(A ∪ {i}, vˆ) denote a threshold for element i.
• Let bi (A) := Evˆ∼Dˆ[bi (A, vˆ)] denote the base price for element i.
3.2 Reducing to Bernoulli Distributions
In this section we show that it suffices to only prove eorem 1.5 for Bernoulli distributions.
Lemma 3.3. If there exists an α-approximation ex-ante prophet inequality for Bernoulli distributed indepen-
dent random values then there exists an α-approximation ex-ante prophet inequality for general distributed
independent random values.
Proof. Given a prophet inequality instance where v ∼ D for a general distribution D, consider a new
Bernoulli prophet inequality instance v′ ∼ D ′ where for each i ∈ N , r.v. v ′i ∼ D
′
i independently takes
value yi (defined in (2)) w.p. xi , and is 0 otherwise. Since the optimal ex-ante fractional value for both the
general and Bernoulli instance is the same, to prove this theorem we use an ex-ante prophet inequality
for the Bernoulli instance to design an ex-ante prophet inequality for the general instance with the same
expected value.
On arrival of an element i, consider an algorithm for the general distribution that treats i is active iff
vi takes value in its top xi quantile. If active, the algorithm asks the ex-ante prophet inequality of the
Bernoulli instance to decide whether to select i. We claim that the expected value of this algorithm is
α ·
∑
i xiyi , which will prove this theorem. e claim is true because for the above algorithm each element
i is active independently w.p. exactly xi , and conditioned on being active its expected value is exactly
yi . us by linearity of expectation, the expected value is the same as the Bernoulli instance, which is
α ·
∑
i xiyi . 
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3.3 Adversarial Order
We prove the optimal ex-ante prophet inequality for a matroid under the adversarial arrival.
eorem 3.4. For matroids, there exists a 1/2-approximation ex-ante prophet inequality for adversarial ar-
rival order.
Given the notation and definitions in §3.1, the proof ofeorem 3.4 is similar to the proof of thematroid
prophet inequality in [KW12].
By Lemma 3.3, we know it suffices to prove this theorem only for Bernoulli distributions. Consider
v ∼ D as the input to our online algorithm, where vi takes value yi w.p. xi and is 0 otherwise. Given
v, our algorithm is deterministic and let A := A(v) denote the set of elements that it selects. Relabel the
elements such that the arrival order of the elements is 1, . . . ,n. Let Ai = A ∩ {1, . . . , i}.
Our algorithm selects the next element i iff bothvi > Ti := α ·bi (Ai−1) and selecting i is feasible inM,
where α = 12 . us, the total value of algorithm Alg :=
∑
i∈Avi = Revenue + Utility, where
Revenue :=
∑
i∈A Ti and Utility :=
∑
i∈A(vi − Ti )
+
.
Since
∑
i∈N xiyi is the optimal value of (1), to proveeorem 3.4 it suffices to show E[Alg] = E[Revenue]+
E[Utility] ≥ α ·
∑
i∈N xiyi .
We keep track of the algorithm’s progress using the following residual function:
r (i) := Ev∼D, vˆ∼Dˆ[R(Ai−1, vˆ)].
Clearly, r (0) =
∑
i∈N xiyi . In the following Lemma 3.5 and Lemma 3.6, we use the residual function to
lower bound E[Revenue] and E[Utility].
Lemma 3.5. Ev∼D[Revenue] = α ·
(
r (0) − r (n)
)
.
Proof. From the definition of Revenue, we get
Revenue = α ·
∑
i∈A
bi (Ai−1) = α ·
∑
i∈A
(
Evˆ[R(Ai−1, vˆ)] − Evˆ[R(Ai−1 ∪ {i}, vˆ)]
)
= α ·
∑
i∈A
(
Evˆ[R(Ai−1, vˆ)] − Evˆ[R(Ai , vˆ)]
)
= α ·
(
Evˆ[R(A0, vˆ)] − Evˆ[R(A, vˆ)]
)
.
Taking expectation over v ∼ D and using definitions of r (0) and r (n), the lemma follows. 
Lemma 3.6. Ev∼D[Utility] ≥ (1 − α) · r (n).
Proof. We prove the following two inequalities:
Ev∼D[Utility] ≥ Ev∼D, vˆ∼Dˆ
[ ∑
i∈Opt(vˆ |A)
(vˆi − Ti )
+
]
(3)
and
Ev∼D, vˆ∼Dˆ
[ ∑
i∈Opt(vˆ |A)
(vˆi − Ti )
+
]
≥ (1 − α) · Ev∼D, vˆ∼Dˆ[R(A, vˆ)]. (4)
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Lemma 3.6 now follows by summing (3) and (4), and using r (n) = Ev∼D, vˆ∼Dˆ[R(A, vˆ)].
To prove (3), notice that for any i not selected by the algorithm, vi ≤ Ti . is implies
Ev∼D[Utility] = Ev
[∑
i∈A
(vi − Ti )
+
]
= Ev
[∑
i∈N
(vi − Ti )
+
]
.
Now observe that for any fixed i and v1, . . . ,vi−1, the threshold Ti is determined. Since vi and vˆi are
independent random variables with the same distribution, we get
Ev[(vi − Ti )
+ |v1, . . . ,vi−1] = Ev, vˆ[(vˆi − Ti )
+ |v1, . . . ,vi−1].
is implies
Ev∼D[Utility] = Ev
[∑
i∈N
(vi − Ti )
+
]
= Ev, vˆ
[∑
i∈N
(vˆi − Ti )
+
]
≥ Ev, vˆ
[ ∑
i∈Opt(vˆ |A)
(vˆi − Ti )
+
]
.
Finally, to prove (4), we have
Ev, vˆ[R(A, vˆ)] = Ev, vˆ
[ ∑
i∈Opt(vˆ |A)
vˆi
]
≤ Ev, vˆ
[ ∑
i∈Opt(vˆ |A)
Ti
]
+ Ev, vˆ
[ ∑
i∈Opt(vˆ |A)
(vˆi − Ti )
+
]
≤ α · Ev, vˆ[R(A, vˆ)] + Ev, vˆ
[ ∑
i∈Opt(vˆ |A)
(vˆi − Ti )
+
]
,
where the first inequality uses vˆi ≤ Ti + (vˆi −Ti )
+ and the second inequality uses Claim 3.7 for S = Opt(vˆ |
A). Aer rearranging, this implies (4). 
We need the following Claim 3.7 in the proof of Lemma 3.6.
Claim 3.7. For every pair of disjoint sets A,S such that A ∪ S ∈ M,
α · E
vˆ∼Dˆ
[∑
i∈S
R(Ai−1, vˆ) − R(Ai−1 ∪ {i}, vˆ)
]
=
∑
i∈S
Ti ≤ α · Evˆ∼Dˆ[R(A, vˆ)]. (5)
Proof. is directly follows from [KW12], as they proved it for every fixed vˆ. e proof is similar to
Claim 3.12 in the next section. 
Proof of eorem 3.4. Using Lemma 3.5 and Lemma 3.6, and substituting α = 12 , we get
E[Alg] = E[Utility] + E[Revenue] ≥
1
2
· r (0) =
1
2
·
∑
i∈N
xiyi . 
3.4 Random Order
We prove the optimal ex-ante prophet inequality for a matroid for random arrival.
eorem 3.8. For matroids, there exists a (1 − 1/e)-approximation ex-ante prophet inequality for uniformly
random arrival order.
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e proof of eorem 3.8 is similar to the matroid prophet secretary inequality in [EHKS18]. We
consider the model where each item chooses the arrival time from [0, 1] uniformly and independently,
which is equivalent to the random permutation model. Starting with A0 = ∅, let At denote the set of
accepted elements by our algorithm before time t . is is a random variable that depends on the values v
and arrival times T. For t ∈ [0, 1], let
α(t) := 1 − exp(t − 1).
Suppose an element i arrives at time t , then our algorithm selects i iff both vi > α(t) · bi (At ) and selecting
i is feasible inM.
Similar to §3.3, we keep track of the algorithm’s progress using the residual function
r (t) := Ev∼D, vˆ∼Dˆ,T[R(At , vˆ)],
where At is a function of v and T. Clearly, r (0) =
∑
i∈N xiyi .
Claim 3.9. Ev∼D,T[Revenue] = −
∫ 1
t=0
α(t) · r ′(t)dt .
Proof. is follows directly from the definition of Revenue. See [EHKS18] for details. 
Lemma 3.10. Ev∼D,T[Utility] ≥
∫ 1
t=0
(1 − α(t)) · r (t)dt .
Proof. e utility for element i arriving at time t is given by
Ev,T[ui | Ti = t] = Ev,T−i
[
(vi − α(t) · bi (At ))
+ · χi<Span(At )
 Ti = t ] .
Observe that At does not depend on vi if Ti = t because it includes only the acceptances before t . It does
not depend on vˆi either, as vˆi is only used for analysis purposes and not known to the algorithm. Since vi
and vˆi are identically distributed, we can also write
Ev∼D,T[ui | Ti = t] = Ev∼D, vˆ∼Dˆ,T−i
[
(vˆi − α(t) · bi (At ))
+ · χi<Span(At )
 Ti = t ] . (6)
Now observe that element i can belong to Opt(vˆ | At ) only if it’s not already in Span(At ), which implies
χi<Span(At ) ≥ χi∈Opt(vˆ |At ). Using this and removing non-negativity, we get
Ev,T[ui | Ti = t] ≥ Ev, vˆ,T−i
[
(vˆi − α(t) · bi (At )) · χi∈Opt(vˆ |At )
 Ti = t ] .
Now we use Lemma 3.11 to remove the conditioning on element i arriving at time t as this gives a valid
lower bound on expected utility,
Ev,T[ui | Ti = t] ≥ Ev, vˆ,T
[
(vˆi − α(t) · bi (At )) · χi∈Opt(vˆ |At )
]
. (7)
We can now lower bound sum of all the utilities using Eq. (7) to get
Ev,T[Utility] =
∑
i
∫ 1
t=0
Ev,T[ui | Ti = t] · dt
≥
∑
i
∫ 1
t=0
Ev, vˆ∼Dˆ,T
[
(vˆi − α(t) · bi (At )) · χi∈Opt(vˆ |At )
]
· dt .
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By moving the sum over elements inside the integrals, we get
Ev,T[Utility] ≥
∫ 1
t=0
Ev, vˆ,T
[∑
i
(vˆi − α(t) · bi (At )) · χi∈Opt(vˆ |At )
]
· dt
=
∫ 1
t=0
Ev, vˆ,T
[
R(At , vˆ) − α(t) ·
∑
i∈Opt(vˆ |At )
bi (At )
]
· dt .
Finally, using Claim 3.12 for S = Opt(vˆ | At ), we get
Ev,T[Utility] ≥
∫ 1
t=0
Ev, vˆ,T [(1 − α(t)) · R(At , vˆ)] · dt . 
Proof of eorem 3.8. Using Lemma 3.10 and Claim 3.9, we get
E[Alg] = E[Revenue] + E[Utility]
≥ −
∫ 1
t=0
α(t) · r ′(t) · dt +
∫ 1
t=0
(1 − α(t)) · r (t) · dt
=
∫ 1
t=0
r (t) · (1 − α(t) + α ′(t)) · dt − [r (t) · α(t)]1t=0 .
Notice that for α(t) = 1 − et−1 , we have 1 − α(t) + α ′(t) = 0. Hence, we get
E[Alg] ≥ −[r (t) · α(t)]1t=0 =
(
1 −
1
e
)
· r (0) =
(
1 −
1
e
)
·
∑
i∈N
xiyi . 
Finally, we prove the missing Lemma 3.11 that removes the conditioning on i arriving at t .
Lemma 3.11. For any i, any time t , and any fixed v, vˆ, we have
ET−i
[
(vˆi − α(t) · bi (At )) · χi∈Opt(vˆ |At ) | Ti = t
]
≥ ET
[
(vˆi − α(t) · bi (At )) · χi∈Opt(vˆ |At )
]
.
Proof. We prove the lemma for any fixed T−i . Suppose we draw a uniformly random Ti ∈ [0, 1]. Observe
that ifTi ≥ t then we have equality in the above equation because setAt is the same both with and without
i. is is also the case when Ti < t but i is not selected into At . Finally, when Ti < t and i ∈ At we have
χi∈Opt(vˆ |At ) = 0 in the presence of element i (i.e., RHS of lemma), making the inequality trivially true. 
Claim 3.12. For any fixed v,T, time t , and set of elements S ⊆ N that is independent in the matroid M/At ,
we have ∑
i∈S
bi (At ) ≤ Evˆ [R(At , vˆ)] .
Proof. By definition ∑
i∈S bi (At ) = Evˆ [
∑
i∈S (R(At , vˆ) − R(At ∪ {i}, vˆ))] .
Fix the values vˆ arbitrarily, we also have
∑
i∈S
(R(At , vˆ) − R(At ∪ {i}, vˆ)) ≤ R(At , vˆ).
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is follows from the fact that R(At , vˆ) − R(At ∪ {i}, vˆ) are the respective critical values of the greedy
algorithm onM/At with values vˆ. erefore, the bound follows from Lemma 3.2 in [LB10]. An alternative
proof is given as Proposition 2 in [KW12] while in our case the first inequality can be skipped and the
remaining steps can be followed replacing A by At .
Taking the expectation over vˆ, the claim follows. 
A Illustrative Examples
A.1 A 1/2-OCRS for Rank 1Matroids
Given x ∈ [0, 1]n satisfying
∑
i xi ≤ 1, in this section we present the proof of 1/2-selectable OCRS due to
Alaei [Ala14] for completeness. (He called it the Magician’s problem.)
eorem A.1 (Alaei [Ala14]). ere exists a 1/2-OCRS for a rank 1 matroid.
Since the algorithm selects at most 1 element, the only decision it makes is whether to accept the next
element i if it is active. e main idea is to ignore (i.e., not consider) i with maximum probability, while
satisfying that on average it is considered at least α fraction of times for some fixed α (we later set α = 1/2).
us on reaching i, the algorithm selects i iff it is both considered and is active.
Proof. Relabel the elements s.t. the arrival order is 1, 2, . . . ,n. For i ∈ [n], let ri denote the probability that
the algorithm reaches i, i.e., it has not selected any of the elements [n−1]. us, r1 = 1 and we want rn = α .
Let qi denote the probability that i is considered, conditioned on the event that algorithm reaches i. e
algorithm sets qi s.t. it considers each element w.p. α , i.e.,
ri · qi = α . (8)
Since on reaching i the algorithm accepts it only when it is both considered and active,
ri+1 = ri · (1 − qixi ).
Now using (8), this gives
ri+1 = ri − αxi .
Summing over all i and using r1 = 1, we get
rn = r1 − α
∑
i xi ≥ 1 − α .
Finally, using rn = α , we get α ≥ 1/2. 
A.2 A (1 − 1/e)-RCRS for Rank 1Matroids
Given x ∈ [0, 1]n satisfying
∑
i xi ≤ 1, in this section we give a simple (1 − 1/e)-selectable RCRS. As a
corollary, this gives an alternate proof of the (1 − 1/e)-prophet secretary for single item due to Esfandiari
et al. [EHLM17].
We first notice that the random order can be emulated by assuming each element i selects a random
time ti to arrive uniformly at random in the interval [0, 1].
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eorem A.2. An algorithm that selects an active element i arriving at time t ∈ [0, 1] with probability
exp(−t · xi ) (and ignores i otherwise) is (1 − 1/e)-selectable for a rank 1 matroid; that is, on average this
algorithm considers (not ignore) any element i at least (1 − 1/e) fraction of the times.
Proof. By reaching time t (element j), let us denote the event that no element is selected before time t
(element j’s arrival). We start by noticing that for any element i ∈ [n],
Pr[i is considered] =
∫ 1
t=0
Pr[i is considered at time t | reach time t & i arrives at t ]
· Pr[reach time t | i arrives at t] · dt
=
∫ 1
t=0
exp(−t · xi ) · Pr[reach time t | i arrives at t ] · dt . (9)
Now we can simplify
Pr[reach time t | i arrives at t]
=
∏
j,i
(
1 − Pr[j arrives before t & is active & is considered | reach j]
)
=
∏
j,i
(
1 − x j · Pr[j arrives before t & is considered| reach j]
)
=
∏
j,i
(
1 − x j ·
∫ t
a=0
exp(−a · x j ) · da
)
=
∏
j,i
exp(−t · x j ).
Now combining this equation with (9), we get
Pr[i is considered] =
∫ 1
t=0
exp(−t · xi ) ·
∏
j,i
exp(−t · x j ) · dt
≥
∫ 1
t=0
exp(−t) · dt = 1 −
1
e
,
where the inequality uses
∑
i xi ≤ 1. 
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